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Focusing on the recent emergence of behavioral and experimental economics and its implications 
for the design and implementation of social policies, we demonstrate that geographies of market-
ization are not confined to the narrow study of the models of neoclassical economics. We struc-
ture our argument around what we perceive as key dimensions of marketization and their varie-
gated geographies: First, we argue for renewed attention to the naturalization of abstract market 
knowledge and its methodological separation from real markets in the wake of the behavioral 
and experimental turn. We then turn to really existing markets, conceptualizing them as articula-
tions of a variety of economic and social rationalities struggling over an apparent “moral mar-
ket.” Third, we focus on the role of the nonhuman in marketization processes and discuss the 
work of market devices in making these market arrangements possible. In the fourth and final 
section we turn to the “human side” of marketization. Our argument is that market struggles con-
nect with the formation of “quasi-subjects” that oscillate between attempts to reestablish auton-
omy and their dissolution in the disciplining webs of behavioral and experimental market de-
vices. Throughout the text we illustrate our arguments on the so-called social impact bonds as a 
concrete example for the types of policy intervention. 
 
 




For a long time the market has been treated as a black box in the social sciences. This 
crucially includes mainstream economics where the market emerged as a natural and ahistorical 
matter of fact. The situation within political economy has not been all too different. Privileging 
the realm of production over the realm of exchange, classical political economy largely confined 
the market to rare appearances in the form of a particular market place or a geographical area. 
Positioning itself against the formalist understanding of the market as an ideal-type norm, Marx-
ian political economy criticizes bourgeois notions of the market as ideological and relegates it to 
second place, being unintelligible without an understanding of immediate production processes. 
Whether in Marxian stripes or not, heterodox political economy, by and large, had little interest 
in analyzing the market beyond sweeping debates of the destructive consequences of the market 
ideology in the form of “runaway” market forces, a position that also informs much of the con-
temporary neoliberalization and globalization critique.  
This situation has changed. Renewed attention to the market has been a pluralist affair, 
economic sociology, for instance, seeing the emergence of an embedded or coordinated market 
paradigm (see White 2002; Beckert 2009), pragmatist convention theory (e.g., Boltanski and 
Thevenot 2006) or the engagement with markets from a science and technology studies (STS) 
perspective (e.g., Callon 1998). Of course, political economy widely understood did not stand 
still either. While arguably still privileging the realm of accumulation, regulation theory pro-
vided a welcome first step. But it has been mainly the ongoing revival of Polanyian thought that 
has rekindled the interest in markets and market exchange within political economy (e.g., Peck 
2013). 
Economic geography is a good example for these developments. There has been a fledg-
ling interest in social network approaches to markets (see, for instance, Grabher 2004). But more 
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comprehensive contributions come from other traditions. On the one hand, this concerns at-
tempts to establish a Polanyian approach in the discipline, as part of the wider plea toward plu-
ralism and openness that underwrites geographical political economy more generally (see Peck 
and Theodore 2007; Barnes and Sheppard 2010; Sheppard 2011; Peck 2013). On the other hand, 
there is work that engages with social studies of economization from a geographical perspective, 
or what Berndt and Boeckler have termed geographies of marketization (see Berndt and Boeck-
ler 2009, 2012; Ouma, Boeckler, and Lindner 2013).  
It is the latter, cultural economic perspective on markets that provides the conceptual ba-
sis of our article. In what follows, our main objective is, first, to address remaining shortcomings 
in this interdisciplinary literature. These concern above all a mechanical, narrow focus on the 
perfect market as defined by neoclassical economics and a sometimes cavalier treatment of ques-
tions of power and inequality. A second related aim is to think through in more detail what a ge-
ographical approach toward markets and marketization might entail. 
Geographies of marketization are inspired by an STS and actor-network theory (ANT). In 
his application of these research programs to economic processes and behavior, Callon has sug-
gested to approach the formation of economic entities as agencements (e.g., Callon 2007). This 
refers to the insight that markets and other economic entities are combinations of human beings 
and physical objects. In these constellations, equipment and infrastructure matter: they change 
the nature of the economic agent, of economic action, and thus of the entity in question (Mac-
Kenzie 2009). The term agencement conveys the idea of a (spatial) assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements that have been carefully arranged, as well as the notion of agency: socio-technical as-
semblages endowed with the capacity to bring about agency, to act and to give meaning to action 
(Callon 2007, 319-321; see Cochoy 2018). Agency is therefore not limited to the individual con-
ceptualized as being “bounded by the skin” (Hutchins 1995, 289). Cognitive and calculative pro-
cesses are “distributed” in the sense that a given task is often performed not by a single unaided 
human being but by a “human-nonhuman working group“ as the locus of agency (Bennett 2010, 
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xvii). Emphasis is put on two types of key agents: things and science, or, to be more precise, 
market devices and economics, widely understood.  
There are manifold elements that work together to equip concrete markets. At the end of 
the day, the precise arrangement of concrete markets depends on specific figurations of these 
agencements, objectifying goods, forming qualculating subjects and mapping spaces of encoun-
ter that organize market exchange with the help of the price mechanism in particular ways. It is 
important to emphasize that these performances are the result of iterative processes of reference: 
economic entities, such as markets, are conceived as effects of heterogeneous networks that ap-
pear to be stable and permanent but always remain incomplete and open to contestation (Mitchell 
2014). 
As we will illustrate in more detail below, such an approach is capable of shedding light 
into the particular ways in which concrete markets emerge and evolve, but also how they are al-
ways prone to failure and malfunction. But as any other theoretical perspective the marketization 
approach has its limits. Forceful accounts of these shortcomings have been given by scholars 
who write from a political economy position, epitomized, for instance, by the more unforgiving 
early critiques from Miller (e.g., 2002), or Fine (e.g., 2003). More recently there has been a ten-
dency toward more constructive debate, above all within economic geography. From such a po-
sition of sympathetic critique two points stand out that are important for the purpose of our arti-
cle: The first concerns an overemphasis on the neoclassical perfect market as driven by atomized 
rational individuals and the absence of any coherent idea about the object of study in the market-
ization literature. Second, there is the long-standing criticism that finds fault with a perceived ab-
sence of questions of power and inequality. Both omissions have the effect of depoliticizing the 
question of the economy and run the danger of stabilizing the neoclassical market, thus playing 
into the hands of the hegemonic orthodoxy (for more recent examples for these arguments see, 
for instance, Muellerleile 2013; Christophers 2014; Cohen 2017). 
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These are important questions that scholarly work informed by economization or market-
ization needs to take into account. In this article we develop a more systematic account of how a 
marketization approach can be sensitive toward these issues, including a more nuanced engage-
ment with the varied geographies of marketization, another omission in the respective literature 
so far (but see Kear 2017). Rather than remaining on the terrain of the neoclassical market we 
turn to the recent emergence of behavioral and experimental economics (BEE) as an apparent 
challenger to orthodox economic thinking and its increasing importance for the design and im-
plementation of social policies both in the Global North and the Global South. With this shift of 
attention, we seek to demonstrate that a marketization approach is capable of doing more than 
simply reemphasizing the performative force of neoclassical economics and of adopting a one-
sided view of marketization as a unidirectional expansion of the market logic. We take account 
of this shift through the lens of four key dimensions of marketization that structure the main part 
of the article.  
First, we argue for renewed attention to the naturalization of abstract Market knowledge 
and its methodological separation from real markets in the wake of the behavioral and experi-
mental turn. We then turn to really existing markets, conceptualizing them as articulations of a 
variety of economic and social rationalities struggling over an apparent moral market. Third, we 
focus on the role of the nonhuman in marketization processes and discuss the work of market de-
vices in making these market arrangements possible. In doing so, we direct our attention to their 
active stabilizing role, being involved in boundary work both socially and geographically. In the 
fourth and final section we turn to the human side of marketization. Our argument is that market 
struggles connect with the formation of quasi-subjects that oscillate between attempts to reestab-
lish autonomy and their dissolution in the disciplining webs of behavioral and experimental mar-
kets devices. 
Throughout the paper we illustrate our arguments with empirical material from Wirth’s 
doctoral research on the so-called social impact bonds (SIBs) as a concrete example for the types 
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of policy intervention informed by economic behaviorism and experimentalism. SIBs are a phe-
nomenon within the growing field of social impact investing, arguably occupying a middle 
ground between traditional investments and funding activities that do not seek financial returns 
such as grant giving or philanthropy. The world’s first SIB was launched in September 2010 in 
Peterborough, UK, aiming to reduce recidivism among prisoners on short sentences. The Peter-
borough example was quickly emulated by a wealth of similar arrangements throughout the 
country. As of today, the UK hosts thirty-three SIBs.1 As epicenter of SIB activity the UK repre-
sents by far the largest market for this funding mechanism globally. From there, the SIB policy 
template has traveled widely, first touching down in the US under the name of payment-for-suc-
cess in 2012 and also in other English language countries (e.g., Australia), and then increasingly 
raising attention in mainland Europe (Höchstädter and Scheck, 2015; Rangan and Chase, 2015). 
It is estimated that there are currently more than sixty active or planned SIBs worldwide (Dear et 
al. 2016). 
SIBs are performance-based contracts where “private investors provide the funding and 
are repaid later by the government (along with a potential profit) if the service meets agreed-on 
performance benchmarks” (Rangan and Chase 2015, 28). Their supposed innovation is derived 
from the inclusion of third-party investors who provide money to fund a social service program 
(e.g., reducing prison recidivism rates or youth unemployment in a certain locality). If the targets 
that have been agreed in the contract are met, then the investors receive payments from the gov-
ernment. Payments include a financial return in addition to initial costs that varies with the extent 
to which outcomes improve. If the offered service does not meet these outcomes, the investors 
lose their money (Barclay and Symons 2013). For governments this is attractive—it gets the op-
eration of expensive social services off their books and creates at least the illusion that money is 
                                               
1 See Social Finance’s Impact Bond Global Database, http://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk. 
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saved. As a manifestation of increasing private-sector involvement in social policy delivery im-
pact, investing has a lot in common with phenomena such as corporate social responsibility, so-
cial enterprise, not-for-loss business, and corporate philanthropy, all to varying degrees regarded 
by insiders as “[sacrifying] economic profits in return for social impact” (Clyde and Karnani 
2015, 20) and forming part of what has come to be known as social economy (see Amin 2009; 
for a detailed empirical analysis; see also Berndt and Wirth 2018). 
 
[level1]Mobilizing Variegated Market Knowledge 
What is a market? On the one hand, images of specific, real-world markets come to 
mind: the market for a particular product, a particular marketplace. On the other hand, there are 
abstract notions of some core principles that define market exchange such as the law of demand 
and supply, price competition, rational choice, and so on. “Small m” markets as concrete soci-
ospatial realizations contrast with “big M” Market as an ideal-type economic logic. The former 
have always been the more familiar terrain of (economic) geographers, given the interest in the 
discipline in spatial context and historic contingency.  
From a marketization perspective, a key question is how a particular economic 
knowledge2 is capable of performing market realities both at particular historic and spatial con-
junctures and—crucially—how idealized market frames change over time. For a long time, the 
hegemonic knowledge was provided by a powerful family of scholarly thought: neoclassical eco-
nomics and related approaches. This orthodox economic mainstream advanced the formal defini-
tion of the perfect market as a benchmark that allowed its proponents to draw a boundary against 
everything that lies beyond. A strict separation from the social and cultural is established, a non-
                                               
2 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to the role of knowledge production about mar-
kets (see also Pollard et al. 2009, 138).  
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market other that is excluded, or to use the language of the discipline, is externalized. Main-
stream economics has never made a secret of the fact that it considers the market mechanism as 
superior and that it is desirable for the realm of the market to expand, to move the border further 
into the nonmarket terrain. As the burgeoning literature on land grabbing and accumulation by 
dispossession illustrates, market expansion has direct geographical qualities regularly implying 
shifting market frontiers and the commodification of people (i.e., labor) and nature (i.e., land). 
Underlying this expansionary thrust is a positive, harmonic view of marketization that does not 
acknowledge inequality beyond the fact that humans are endowed with different skills and capa-
bilities. 
The continuing importance of neoclassical market knowledge notwithstanding, it has be-
come increasingly clear recently that these stylized ideas are no longer the unrivaled economic 
knowledge patterning our daily life. A key reason for this has been the recent financial crisis and 
the subsequent legitimization problem of neoclassical economics. As much as many mainstream 
economists may still believe, they are no longer the masters of their abstract models and are 
forced to readjust their frame. This provided a window of opportunity for strands of economic 
thought that have been successfully marginalized by the neoclassical mainstream: BEE. 
Contemporary behavioral economic thinking builds on the findings put forward by cogni-
tive psychologists Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974), its 
conceptualization of human cognition being based on the assumption that mental processes can 
be divided “into two general categories depending on whether they operate automatically or in a 
controlled fashion” (Gawronski and Creighton 2013, 282). Since the 1980s this evolving class of 
so-called dual process theories has come to play an important role in psychology (Gawronski and 
Creighton 2013). In the variant put forward by Kahneman, the argument is that judgments can 
ideally be produced in two ways, “a rapid, associative, automatic, and effortless intuitive process 
(sometimes called System 1), and a slower, rule-governed, deliberate process (System 2)” 
(Kahneman 2002, 8). System 1 is automatic and unconscious. System 2 is rule based, rational, 
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and explicit. It monitors system 1 and is able to rationalize ideas and feelings that were generated 
by system 1. It is also able to correct or replace erroneous intuitive judgments. However, this 
does not happen all the time. Since system 2 has its limits, system 1 often prevails, leading to in-
tuitive and often erroneous judgements (Kahneman 2002). 
While this model is in principle assumed to have universal traction, the world of the two 
cognitive systems becomes the world of different types of people when translated into the policy 
realm. On the one hand are the experts who are (almost) rational; on the other are ordinary peo-
ple who are mainly steered by emotions, affect, and rules of thumb, and are locked in suboptimal 
outcomes. On the one hand are ideal type econs, modeled after the famous homo oeconomicus. 
On the other side are imperfect humans, driven by system 1, with system 2 only delivering spuri-
ous checks and balances (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Kahneman 2011).  
It is important to note that the gap between both perspectives is not nearly as wide as we 
are made to believe. Behavioral economists share the normative view that rational maximization 
is what people should do. Protagonists of behaviorism in economics continue to conceptualize 
individuals as means-ends–oriented, weakening the assumption that they are all-knowing and 
perfect calculators only to some extent. In so doing, the perfect rationality assumption reenters 
the stage through the backdoor. At the end of the day, therefore, the emerging new behavioral 
orthodoxy provides a means to stabilize the neoclassical project during turbulent times, translat-
ing it into a utopian yardstick to measure concrete economic behavior and a behavioral norm 
performing economic realities. In this vein BEE joins other amendments of the neoclassical pro-
ject that mobilize institutions, conventions, cultural values or routines as “socio-cognitive pros-
theses that enable the (economic) formatting of individual behaviours” (Çalışkan and Callon 
2009, 380). The idealized neoclassical market therefore continues to have a powerful presence in 
the seemingly new economic script. 
With a view to the policy implications of all this, there is a crucial shift in emphasis: at-
tention moves away from the market as an institutional arena to the individual, or better from 
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market failure to the failing market subject (for recent contributions from geography, see, for in-
stance, Langley and Leaver 2012; Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead 2013; Berndt 2015). This can be 
illustrated by our example of SIBs and impact investing. It is obvious that the market as concep-
tualized in standard economic theory does not provide the blueprint for performing these policy 
interventions. The conditions that SIBs and similar interventions codify as “social problems” are 
conceived of as resulting from behavioral failures that have to be corrected. SIBs repeatedly mo-
bilize behavioral economic thinking. An influential document published by McKinsey, for in-
stance, celebrates SIBs as “especially well suited to scale interventions focused on behaviour 
change” (Callanan, Law, and Mendonca 2012, 12). Another example is the work of Nesta (Na-
tional Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts), a British private charity that was 
founded in 1997 as a public body with National Lottery money and was subsequently privatized 
in 2010. Nesta has published a number of to-do guidelines and manuals on impact investment 
and SIBs, and is financially involved in impact investment projects. In their various publications 
,Nesta representatives make frequent connections with behavioral economic thinking. Current 
CEO Geoff Mulgan, for instance, stresses the need to make social investment more concrete by 
incentivizing outcomes and by addressing people individually. Arguing that risks may also be 
“the result of behaviour and lifestyle choices,” he aims at “helping citizens to make sense of wel-
fare, and sometimes nudging them to change their behaviour“ (Mulgan 2016, 3, 8). The extent to 
which behavioral economics and SIBs are connected can also be demonstrated with the activities 
of the so-called UK Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), an institution linked to the UK govern-
ment that promotes the use of behavioral science in public policy. In the UK, a large number of 
SIBs are commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) which often teams up 
with BIT. SIB projects initiated by the DWP focus on labor market issues, revolving around is-
sues of education and employability of young, vulnerable people with a low-income background 
and explicitly addressing issues such as behavior at school, truancy, or achieving educational 
qualification levels (Dear et al. 2016).  
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There are two ways in which the rise to prominence of the behavioral Market knowledge 
is relevant for economic geographers. First, there is the ubiquitous translation of behavioral eco-
nomic thinking into the world of policy formulation and implementation at a global scale. A key 
step was the active adoption of behavioral insights across the political spectrum by the 2010 coa-
lition government in the UK (Behavioural Insights Team) and the Obama administration (White 
House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team). Applications of behavioral economic thought to 
social policy subsequently spread across the English-language world (Pykett 2012). More re-
cently, it touched down in mainland Europe, for instance, in France with the establishment of the 
secrétariat général pour la modernisation de l’action publique (SGMAP) charged with assisting 
the government with its mission to encourage “the public sector to take on board new ways of 
designing and pursuing public policy”3 and the establishment of Nudge France a platform with 
close ties to SGMAP. Aided by the work of policy centers at US universities that aim at dissemi-
nating experimental methods (e.g., J-PAL at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) behav-
ioral economic thought also traveled to countries in the Global South (see Berndt 2015). There is 
also an increasing interest from multinational organizations such as OECD, the European Union, 
or the World Bank (Jones and Whitehead 2018). This is a breathtaking instance of knowledge 
mobility in only a short period of time that economic geographers are well advised to engage 
with.  
Second and closely related to this, the emergence of a new economic orthodoxy poses 
challenges for those (economic) geographers who in one way or another believe in the possibility 
of a different world and seek to do more with their work than simply affirming the dominant 
economic order. This concerns the ultimately conformist nature of BEE, effectively restabilizing 
market-radical thinking and turning a blind eye to any notion of wider historic and spatial con-
text, and the social complexities of human existence. 
                                               
3 See http://modernisation.gouv.fr/en/about-the-sgmap/who-we-are. 
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[level1]Diverse Markets and Marketization Struggles 
Market knowledge and concrete markets belong together, a key question being how both 
materialize relationally. However, it is crucial in our view to acknowledge that concrete markets 
take form at the crossroads of a host of different logics and rationalities, among which “big M” 
Market—however defined—is only but one. As an agencement, concrete markets cannot be re-
duced to the Market as an institutional logic, much the same way as a concrete business firm is 
not only about hierarchical redistribution, or a community is not only about symmetric reciproc-
ity. In short, the point is that economic entities are in principle diverse and have to be studied in 
their diversity (for a similar argument, see Birch and Siemiatycki 2016). Given that we are living 
in a time when market forces appear to be almost everywhere, it is more than justified to focus 
on the diverse ways in which markets are assembled and arranged.  
With their focus on real markets and their emergence in variegated forms, heterodox po-
litical economic approaches share this interest in institutional diversity, analyzing economies as 
“hybrid, more-than-capitalist and variegated” (Peck 2013, 1552). What a marketization perspec-
tive offers to this literature is an emphasis on the process of market making in two ways: first, as 
a struggle between different economic and noneconomic logics that is never fully completed; 
and, second, as an interest in the precise way in which markets emerge as a result of the collabo-
rative effort of humans and nonhumans. 
It makes little sense from a marketization perspective to engage with the question of 
whether the (neoclassical) Market can ever exist in its pure form. Rather, the question is how far 
exactly ideal notions of the Market are capable of realizing themselves in their necessary articu-
lation with other rationalities and valuations. What Callon and others were capable of showing is 
that orthodox economics aims at establishing the M/market division as a matter of fact, thereby 
reifying a particular Market knowledge. This is an ingenious sleight of hand: as long as the 
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boundary between ideal Market and messy market realities is considered as pregiven and natural, 
there is a normative benchmark against which realities can be represented as incomplete, defi-
cient, or pathological. This hides from view that this boundary only creates the illusion of a 
clearly demarcated and bounded terrain, veiling the relational and contested character of market-
ization. 
However, the work of economics does not always go in one direction, unilineally ex-
panding the market realm. In our current late-neoliberal world, economic and political decision-
makers at least at first sight seem to do exactly the opposite. They increasingly mobilize a moral 
social economy that violates long-standing boundaries. Economists in the wild all of a sudden 
happily tear down all the boundaries that they have long defended so vigorously. For some time 
now, there has been a tendency both within the scholarly literature and the ranks of political and 
economic decision-makers to mobilize the idea that markets can be actively utilized for socially 
beneficial ends. Such an understanding of the market as human and moral has assumed a strong 
presence in a variety of policy fields. And behavioral economics and evidence-based experimen-
talism provide important ideational foundations for this.  
Let us briefly return to our example to illustrate this point. SIBs assume variable form as 
quasi-stable entities against a host of others, their identities emerging in ambivalent struggles 
about where to draw the line, about where the market starts and where it ends. The first other is 
the state. The state is variably represented in a typical contradictory narrative as both overtly in-
terventionist, and wasteful and inefficient. This particular understanding of the state as simulta-
neously failing and absent is a key discursive position in the SIB debate. Another narrative posi-
tion represents the state as largely absent. At first sight this appears to be in contradiction to the 
above argument. However, both positions can be reconciled given that the state is criticized for 
distributing subsidies indiscriminately from a distance, without really being interested in the ef-
fects of these interventions. A further negative representation emphasizes the particular financial 
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straightjacket governments increasingly find themselves in. In the case of the UK impact invest-
ing and SIB complex, this refers to the fiscal problems of British municipalities and the wide-
spread assumption that there is no alternative to the austerity regime established by the national 
government (Berndt and Wirth 2018). 
In both cases the role of the state is truly ambivalent, however. There is also a sense that 
the state is needed—but as a neoliberal guarantor of last resort that may cofinance and under-
write the suggested interventions rather than a direct player. This includes the role of new, paral-
lel, semipublic structures involved in financing parts of the interventions. What we have here is 
certainly not a linear process in which the state is simply replaced by the market.  
This is also because the free market is similarly found wanting and in need of a reformu-
lation. In a creative adaptation of Adam Smith’s well-known phrase, there is repeated reference 
to what is termed invisible heart of markets (e.g., Social Impact Investment Taskforce 2014; our 
emphasis; see also Rosenman 2017). The market mechanism can arguably be mobilized for so-
cially beneficial ends, turning an atomistic, asocial institution into a moral one. However, the 
market once again changes its face in dialogue with the third ideal other, associated variably 
with social community, reciprocity, or the nonprofit sector. Protagonists of impact investing and 
SIBs are at pains to keep a distance from more traditional philanthropy. The intention of doing 
good is not enough. Being illustrative of the arbitrariness of the ongoing positioning between 
market, state, and community, it is suddenly the market again that comes to the rescue, making 
sure that doing good is also efficient (Cohen 2013). In so doing, the market reemerges as the in-
visible hand, a hidden disciplinary whip making sure that social workers remain in touch with 
reality. Financial market practices are of particular importance in this context, not least because 
of the frequently stated intention of stakeholders to make SIBs and impact investment bigger. As 
is the case in related fields (e.g., sharing economy) upscaling is normally associated with a main-
streaming of the activities in question.  
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This illustrates how the social, moral market emerges at the crossroads of negative repre-
sentations of the state as interventionist and wasteful, of the free market as destructive, and of 
social community as traditional and obstructive. What gets obvious when looking more carefully 
is (1) that these ideal institutional arrangements assume chameleon-like form depending on what 
they are put in relation with, (2) that these contradictions and frictions often remain hidden in 
successful attempts to portray phenomena as being part of a capitalism with a human face, and 
(3) that a great deal of (re)ordering work is necessary to maintain this impression. In order to re-
alize itself, abstract market thinking gets articulated with all sorts of alternative logics and con-
ventions. At the same time, the performative power of the market logic crucially depends on pu-
rification and separation from those polluting forces. A constitutive market outside has to be cre-
ated, populated by nonmarket agents that are represented as deviant and in need of help.  
There are obvious connections here with the ongoing debate on the role of more-than-
capitalist activities and provisioning logics in contemporary capitalism. In this debate different 
attempts to theorize this relation are put into dialogue with each other, ranging from the stress on 
postcapitalist relations in the diverse economy project (Gibson-Graham 2008), the postcolonial 
conceptualization of capitalism as a complex of capitalist and noncapitalist economic practices in 
which dominance is expressed through difference (Sanyal 2007), or Tsing’s (2015) related no-
tion of “peri-capitalist” activities that exist simultaneously inside and outside capitalism. 
Such an understanding of markets and other economic entities as contingent outcomes of 
the articulation of diverse economic and noneconomic logics contributes to the increasing aware-
ness in the economic geography literature of the incomplete and variegated nature of markets. It 
is also a reminder that these articulations are a far cry from the harmonious view of market ex-
change underpinning much of the mainstream economic literature. At the same time, our ac-
knowledgment of the exclusions and disarticulations that go along with market struggles is not 
the same as mechanically representing marketization as destructive. And neither does it amount 
to a romanticization of the mythical third sector, informing political attempts to instrumentalize 
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community in the name of libertarian paternalism and social investment. It is by decentering and 
denaturalization in all these ways that a marketization perspective is capable of opening ways to 
contestation and resistance. 
The contingency of the precise way in which different logics combine in a particular con-
textual setting also connects with geographical variation. There are two ways in which geogra-
phy intervenes into the boundary struggles of marketization. In the first, more traditional sense, 
there is the translation into particular regional formations as global Market knowledge and its 
policy derivatives get entangled with local ways of doing things. The globally mobile behavioral 
and experimental market script, for instance, translates differently in the climate of austerity and 
the minimal social state of the UK and the more active state setting of countries such as France. 
According to a leading representative of the French SGMAP there are important differences in 
the way behavioral insights are implemented by the Nudge France platform and BIT, for in-
stance (Francoise Waintrop, personal communication March 30, 2017). This is, second, con-
nected to a marked downscaling of the spatial context of policy implementation. Mitchell and 
Sparke (2016, 743) recently highlighted how evidence-based impact investing replaces “national 
governance and territory” with “localized targets of investment.”  
But this is not the only way in which geography comes into play. Our social investment 
example also speaks, third, to more relational understandings of space (Massey 2005). Following 
Ong and Collier (2005), it is possible to conceptualize hegemonic Market knowledge as global 
form (dispositif) and concrete markets as global assemblages (or agencements). As agencements 
or assemblages, concrete markets are never simply local but entities that defy simple fixity/mo-
bility and local/global dualisms (Ong and Collier 2005). Both SIBs and impact investment ar-
rangements more generally are perfect examples for these tensions. In their own particular way 
they still mobilize market calculation as “ideal-typic global form” (Ong and Collier 2005, 13), 
disentangling subjects from their particular social and cultural contexts. Yet at the same time 
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they articulate with other global rationalities, interacting with behavioral assumptions, experi-
mental methods, neoliberal ideas of the state as interventionist and wasteful, or understandings 
of social community either as an obstacle to or a catalyst for change. In so doing market 
agencements can assume manifold form, emerging as an effect of heterogeneous configurations 
of political and economic rationalities and technologies of power that are irreducible to ideal 
economic rationalities. Rather than asserting an overarching general process (e.g., the formation 
of the behavioral and experimental script, the formulation of a particular social investment inter-
vention) and seeing comparative cases as geographical variations of this process, this allows 
us—to paraphrase Hart (2016)—to take seriously that each case (e.g. UK BIT, Nudge France) is 
constituted in relation to one another through practices in multiple and interconnected arenas of 
social policy formulation. 
In sum, as agencements, concrete markets can be articulated in a number of ways. As 
particular sociospatial formations, they acquire their shape not because of the work of one indi-
vidual element, as powerful as it may be, but because of the ways in which the elements per-
forming a market arrangement are relationally organized together. This should not be misunder-
stood as a random process according to which markets can take any form. This poses the ques-
tion of how exactly market arrangements are brought into being. It is to this aspect of marketiza-
tion that we turn now. 
 
[level1]Market Devices  
Starting with the nonhuman side of Bennett’s “human–nonhuman working groups,” a 
wide spectrum of market devices intervenes in the framing of concrete markets and the format-
ting of exchange mechanisms and valuation processes (see Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007; 
Cochoy 2018). These devices do their work in close relation with the particular economic 
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knowledge mobilized. What is needed for a perfect market according to the long-dominant neo-
classical script is an environment that allows the free play of supply and demand, which enables 
humans to act rationally according to their preferences, that is, free from distortions inhibiting 
the market’s god-like allocation mechanism. This translated into particular devices that were mo-
bilized in order to achieve this state, either when correcting the failures of existing markets or 
when designing new ones. Examples would be the installation of a nonhuman Walrasian auc-
tioneer as equilibrium-generating force (e.g., computerized pricing models), computers as mar-
ket-on-the-screen, algorithmic evaluation tools driving digital platforms, or the introduction of 
per unit prices on supermarket shelves. All these devices are introduced to bring market realms 
closer to the neoclassical ideal. 
The rise to prominence of behaviorism and experimentalism changed the situation. While 
continuing to believe in the desirability of the neoclassical market, the assumption is no longer 
that a perfect neoclassical market setting will emerge almost naturally whenever the conditions 
are right. Instead, the argument is that we have to accept our own imperfections and find ways to 
steer our behavior in the right direction, whether we realize this subtle manipulation or not. This 
is rationalized with the dual system model of human cognition introduced above. The market 
cannot be trusted to realize itself all on its own in the light of systematic behavioral anomalies. 
Operating mainly along deliberate system 2, the state as the market’s ultimate other is also inca-
pable of reaching people in those instances when they operate only in the world of heuristics and 
rules of thumb. Against this, economic behaviorists claim to occupy the middle ground, suggest-
ing with asymmetric or libertarian paternalism an institutional frame that is capable of interven-
ing politically with as much state as necessary and as much free market as possible.  
Accordingly, and notwithstanding overlaps in practice, the devices mobilized by the 
practitioners of economic behaviorism have a different quality. By way of simplification, it is 
possible to distinguish two closely intertwined classes of these devices. The first concerns 
nudges. Fully in line with the seemingly micro-/mesolevel script of libertarian paternalism, 
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nudging is about the construction and management of incentive structures “that significantly [al-
ter] the behavior of Humans, even though it would be ignored by Econs” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008, 9). Emphasis is on policies that are smart, that is, policies that help those who are less so-
phisticated cognitively “while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational” 
(Camerer et al. 2003, 1212; see also Pykett 2012). Examples include framing, anchoring, simpli-
fication of products and procedures, and also commitment devices. These can take on concrete 
form such as cell-phone text-message reminders, or visits by experts that remind those subject to 
these policies to do certain things.  
Second, there is the parallel connection of behavioral economic with experimental meth-
ods. Policies are implemented in an environment of ongoing experimentation in which learning 
is meant to take place within interventions and expected to feed back in a cycle of continuous 
adaption. While these demands are attentive to a broad range of different research methods, in-
terventions ultimately have to be based on hard facts about what works and what does not. Alt-
hough measurement and quantification have a longer history in the political realm (Barry 2002), 
these practices have assumed new relevance following the behavioral turn in social policy deliv-
ery (Strassheim, Jung, and Korinek 2015). A crucial step has been the development of the ran-
domized field experiment. Subjects are assigned randomly to either control or experimental 
groups, under the assumption that variations with regard to unidentified factors will be distrib-
uted evenly across the groups (Guala 2005). Although the underlying principle is the classical 
economic notion of ceteris paribus, randomization traveled into economics from the medical 
world. Here, the so-called randomized controlled trial (RCT) has long been an established proce-
dure in the context of clinical investigation. Randomization plays a crucial role in the spread of 
behavioral thinking, the last fifteen years or so having seen a breathtaking spread of this method 
in a wide array of policy realms (see also Webber and Prouse 2018). 
This is also true for our example of social impact investment. SIBs and impact invest-
ment more generally routinely work with nudges. Nesta CEO Mulgan (2016, 3) refers to a “new 
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landscape of tools” as “new ‘operating systems’ for welfare” that help to orchestrate market-
places. These include, among other things, predictive algorithms, technology platforms, digital 
tools, new options for organizing services such as blockchains and commitment devices. “[H]ow 
would we feel,” Mulgan (2016, 8) asks, “if the government sent SMS or equivalent messages to 
warn that we weren’t saving enough for our pensions; that our failure to maintain our skills 
threatened unemployment; that our children were too obese; or that we really should be volun-
teering more in our community?” 
The conditions that SIBs and similar interventions frame as social problems are regularly 
conceived as resulting from behavioral failures that have to be corrected. In addition to the in-
volvement of BIT in the UK, let us point to the case of the New York Rikers Island SIB. This 
project started in 2012 with the aim to prevent future recidivism among young prisoners. In order 
to reduce the number of future days spent in jail after their release, young prisoners could partici-
pate in an intervention called Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE), a program 
based on a cognitive behavioral therapy.  
Second, the practical realization of SIBs has a lot to do with experimental methods and 
an almost insatiable thirst for quantitative evidence and measurement. It is the hope of being able 
to render social investment calculable for more mainstream investors that gives the drive toward 
evidence additional impetus. There is constant pressure to improve measurement methods, to use 
standardized evaluation and metric systems, and to utilize experiments as a means to evaluate the 
outcome of impact investment projects. Attempts to standardize the impact investing movement, 
for example, by establishing an impact investing rating agency (GIIRS), a standardized perfor-
mance metric catalogue (IRIS), or a global impact investor network (GIIN), are indicative of the 
preoccupation with technical questions of measurability and evidence (Narain et al. 2012; OECD 
2015).  
It seems that quantitative measurement and evaluation have become the new gold stand-
ard, finally providing the means to reconcile both the financial investment and the philanthropic 
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side of the moral market (Rangan and Chase 2015). In many social impact bonds RCT designs 
are applied. Control groups may either be built from historic data or from individuals that do not 
receive a social service, that is, a “living control group” (Barclay and Symons 2013, 13). These 
experimental practices are lauded for their apparent superiority to more traditional ones, gaining 
their legitimacy from a modernizing, technocratic discourse celebrating rigor and objectivity 
(Shore and Wright 2015).  
Nudges and experiments translate behavioral and experimental models, creating their 
particular realities in a process of continuous practical enactment. They inscribe themselves into 
the daily lives of policy recipients, in so doing playing a decisive role in reworking the world ac-
cording to the scientific imaginations of experimental and behavioral economists. In collabora-
tion with human agents, new markets are assembled that are capable of integrating elements that 
hitherto were only included marginally. And market devices play a crucial role in stabilizing 
these struggles over the boundaries between different economic and noneconomic logics. These 
boundaries separate normal from the abnormal behavior, and those who receive a particular in-
tervention from those who only make up control groups.  
These lines of difference assume additional force when they materialize spatially, when a 
geographical space is identified that somehow lies outside the realm of the market. This is also 
true for our example. The experts prescribing behavioral therapies and applying the respective 
market devices almost exclusively aim at problems in place. This starts with the subject itself 
and extends to its proximate social relations. Whenever context is admitted into the sealed world 
of nudges and experiments, this refers to the immediate social environment of the people in 
need, family and friends, workplace, local neighborhood. This includes the mobilization of 
translocal sociality that includes the strategic use of Facebook and other social media by case 
workers as a means to monitor and control the lives of individuals receiving a social service 
(Wirth 2018). Confronted with challenges that originate elsewhere, the underlying argument 
goes, we have to assume responsibility both for our own life and our immediate environment. 
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The scripts of market-based social policy interventions articulate irrational and abnormal 
behavior with imaginations of subjects in need and biographies in need of improvement. Accord-
ing to this logic it is these deficiencies that are responsible for poverty, health problems, or un-
employment. This provides the legitimation for interventions that correct behavior and enable 
those subject to them to fit into the marketized world of human capital, lifelong learning, and bi-
ographical flexibility. This can be interpreted as an attempt to roll out the market and move the 
market boundary in addition to the selective blurring of the boundaries between the various insti-
tutional realms. Both moments—articulation with different logics (that is, the blurring of the 
market/nonmarket divide) and purification (that is, the reinscription of the separation between 
the market and its various others)—do not follow each other in a linear, logical fashion but are 
present in any moment in time. Berndt and Boeckler have labeled the geographical dimension of 
these boundary struggles as b/ordering (Berndt and Boeckler 2011), the market devices at the 
heart of this section performing the role of border guards policing these differences. 
However, what appears as a clearly demarcated outside of a bounded terrain (market, 
capitalism) is in fact a constituent part of the inside. In this terrain that demarcates the market 
frontier, the noneconomic or nonmarket plays the role of a stranger inside the gate, the other that 
is neither fully inside nor outside. In so doing, an appearance of a strict separation of entities and 
realms is produced, which in fact are closely connected. B/ordering therefore reminds us that 
marketization is always a highly uneven process. This emphasis on the ambivalent, uneven, and 
incomplete character of marketization is crucial. Economization and marketization are never 
complete, breakdown and failure being as much part of its characteristics as construction and sta-
bilization. It is the impossibility to fully contain and prevent these contradictions that necessitate 
measures to hide and veil, and it is these contradictions in turn that provide opportunities for al-
ternative projects. 
As long as these entanglements can be controlled and kept invisible, b/ordering and fram-
ing create the conditions for a particular marketization script to become mobile. Only then is it 
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possible to entertain the illusion of almost frictionless mobility, “a technocratic replication fan-
tasy—that both designs and outcomes are portable from place to place” (Peck 2011, 176). As 
long as the porosity of the boundaries and borders delimiting the realm of SIB/impact investing 
remains invisible—intervention vs. control groups, calculations of people and localities in need, 
localized risk assessments, the behaviorally deficient nonsocial individual—protagonists are able 
to render the phenomena at hand in a purely technical language, allowing them to maintain the 
illusion of unlimited applicability.  
 
[level1]The Quasi-subjects of Marketization  
Conceptualizing markets as sociotechnical agencements and marketization as a process 
that consequently involves the interplay of human and nonhuman agents is still often misunder-
stood as giving things undue priority over the human subject and colluding with attempts to get 
rid of human agency all together. But this is a misunderstanding. Both objects and subjects are 
treated as quasi-entities in these arrangements, that is, as constituted relationally as networks ef-
fects and as always being under construction and therefore never self-contained. The prominence 
given to the nonhuman side in the early ANT/STS-inspired literature may have more to do with 
the need to unsettle the modernist preoccupation with the autonomous subject than with attempts 
to get rid with the human. In his discussion of Beck’s second modernity thesis Latour (2003, 38) 
summarized his understanding of “being modern” as a clever sleight of hand: It was only be-
cause they took themselves as being disentangled from the uncertainties of nature, the chains of 
history, or the obstinacy of society that humans were able to entangle themselves with “every-
thing on earth and beyond,” allowing “them to do the exact opposite of what they were saying.” 
It would be strange indeed to give material objects a more active role (quasi-objects), while 
maintaining the ideal of the modern, self-contained subject (Latour 2003, 44). From a marketiza-
tion perspective, it makes more sense therefore to see the shift as being about a relatively more 
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active role for the nonhuman and a corresponding relatively less active one for the human side in 
market actor-networks. The process of subjectivation is a key moment of marketization and the 
human subject an important terrain on which to negotiate the contradictions discussed above.  
At first sight, economic behaviorism and experimentalism seem to make this shift. The 
encounter of economic behaviorism with cognitive psychology resulted in a further rearticulation 
of the notion of economic man or woman. This includes the gradual transformation of subjects in 
the Global North and increasingly also in the Global South into human capital under the gaze of 
sociotechnologies such as nudging, priming, or randomization. In the wake of this rearticulation 
the new homo oeconomicus no longer pretends to have autonomous sovereignty. Her agency is 
the relational effect of distributed cognitive and calculative processes. 
Does this mean that the real world is populated by fleeting, boundless subjectivities? The 
stronger the challenge to the coveted ideal of the autonomous human subject, the stronger the 
impulse to redraw the line, to reestablish the old order. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
ideal of the rational, sovereign homo oeconomicus is kept alive. This rebordering is never fully 
completed, but rather an ongoing controversy about how far to adjust the frame performing the 
autonomous individual agent (see Latour 2003, 44). From a marketization perspective, therefore, 
behaviorism and experimentalism have given framing processes a new twist: nudges and ran-
domized experiments intervening in strategic moments to frame possible actions. 
This can be illustrated by the example of social impact investment and SIBs. When the 
recipients of the behavioral and experimental medicine are addressed, they are represented in the 
logic informing behavioral economics as “customers who are risk averse and have ingrained 
habits” (Mair and Milligan 2012, 26). Framing the recipients of interventions as NEETs (Not in 
Employment, Education or Training; Yates and Payne 2006) and conceiving social problems as 
the result of individual failure, SIBs and impact investing establish a disciplinary regime that re-
sponsibilizes those subject to it, stimulating entrepreneurial behavior: “A reassertion of personal 
responsibility for risks over which individuals and families have some control, and incentivising 
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pro-social actions,” as Mulgan (2016, 4) has it. And help is provided in two steps: First, in diag-
nosing systematic deviations from perfect rationality, behavioral economics shifts the site of pol-
icy intervention from the institutional setting (market) to the individual human being (market 
subject). Second, these anomalies are framed as an exclusively technical problem that is amenda-
ble to interventions framed in a logic of behavioral engineering. The recipients of policy inter-
ventions are imagined as capital to themselves, human capital waiting to be extracted with the 
seemingly benevolent help of behavioral engineers. In a characteristic dual logic, it is the reduc-
tion of social humans with a diversity of needs into incentivized entrepreneurial individuals that 
makes it possible to aggregate them into a faceless mass of people in need that can be calculated 
and represented in abstract numbers, in so doing turning them into attractive speculative assets 
that generate financial profit. 
It is easy to see how the libertarian paternalism prescribed by the advocates of the behav-
ioral turn fits into the policy frames characterizing roll-out neoliberalism such as the Third Way 
(Peck and Tickell 2002). According to these scripts, human beings are neither considered as pop-
ulating some larger social class as it was the case at the heydays of the welfare state, nor as ra-
tional autonomous individuals as postulated by mainstream economics. Instead they are ad-
dressed as moral subjects with the obligation to take responsibility for themselves and their lives 
(Rose 2000). In so doing, the emergence of a reformulated behaviorism and the methodological 
challenge of evidence-based experimentalism accompanying it constitute a further step in an on-
going transformation process according to which subjects turn into human capital under the gaze 
of sociotechnologies such as evidence-based policy making and nudging. 
At the same time, however, the behavioral and experimental turn also goes beyond roll-
ing out. The rationale of government intervention advanced by behaviorism is not to repair the 
devastating social effects of marketization with new societal fixes. It is individual human behav-
ior itself that governmental interventions address and shape. Interventions aim at the minds of 
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people; they become intimate by breaking nonrational practices and mental models and commit-
ting them to useful behavior. This can be interpreted as a reconsideration of humans as psycho-
logically driven by unconscious forces and desires. Insofar as governments design evidence-
based interventions that tackle individuals, one might wonder whether we are not witnessing the 
emergence of an additional neoliberal moment of rolling in (Berndt and Boeckler 2017; see also 
Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead 2013; Pykett, Jupp, and Smith 2017).  
From a Foucauldian perspective, this may be interpreted as a return of disciplinary 
power. For those humans found wanting, “conduct of conduct” appears to be increasingly less 
about “behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities” and increasingly more about 
management, direction, and coercion (Foucault 1983, 220–21). 
But the behavioral script does more than only addressing the ultimate targets of the inter-
ventions. It additionally changes the relation between the clients and those responsible for deliv-
ering the treatment in question, in doing so challenging and redefining their role and their own 
subjectivities. Regardless of their enormously diverse background, for instance, regarding expe-
rience with social services or the extent to which they embody a more traditional social work 
ethic, the particular logics driving the new policy model confront implementing actors with 
thinly veiled expectations framed in a language of problem solving, responsibility, and risk tak-
ing. Corresponding entrepreneurial values are transmitted via the mechanisms discussed above, 
that is, performance management, track records, outcome metrics, experimental evidence. Pre-
liminary empirical research of UK examples confirms that those actors who have a social work 
background and a more traditional understanding of their role perceive this as a source of friction 
and strain (Wirth 2018). 
Both recipients of behavioral interventions and the social workers responsible for deliver-
ing them are almost forced to calculate and rationalize. This holds for the latter in particular, 
given the extent to which the ultimate success of the particular policy experiment is measured 
with the outcome metrics, benchmarks, and milestones mentioned earlier. To be sure, the social 
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agencies normally do not bear any immediate financial risk. But representatives are aware of the 
potential damage to their reputation should a particular social finance investor lose money be-
cause of missed outcome targets. It is because of this pressure that social workers look for ways 
to be in control, that is, adopting strategies to closely monitor the behavior of their clients in a 
paternalizing way. This includes active use of social media and a mixture of carrots and sticks, 
always with the aim to steer behavior in the desired way, or the de-risking practice of layering 
clients”according to the perceived likelihood of failure (Wirth 2018).  
There are two closely connected ways in which these processes can be interpreted as in-
stances of b/ordering. The first concerns the insight that representations of behaviorally deficient 
subjects are spatialized. In the narratives of the case worker, irrational behavior is regularly situ-
ated in the private life of the clients, for instance, the home, the pub, or other places of consump-
tion and leisure. At a closer look, however, the borders between places of rational and irrational 
behavior are porous, not least when case workers use the desire for leisurely consumption and 
enjoyment to lure clients into corrective programs and the disciplinary places connected to them. 
The second instance of b/ordering involves the subject itself and the acknowledgment that the 
quasi-subject of marketization is always a b/ordered subject. One the one hand, it almost dis-
solves in the entangled web of human and nonhuman agents that give rise to market 
agencements. In the case of our example this concerns, for instance, the discipline of outcome 
metrics, social media, or de-risking exercises. It is interesting to note in this context that the cli-
ents and consumers of the interventions remain largely invisible both in the academic debate and 
in the documents and reports that emanate from the industry. On the other hand, there are at-
tempts to redraw the line, to reassure oneself of subjective agency against the outside world. 
Those attempts to remodernize can be observed both with the implementing social workers as 
well as the recipients of behavioral interventions.  
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[level1]Conclusion 
We started our article with the observation that the market has made an astonishing 
comeback both in the social sciences more generally and within the subdiscipline of economic 
geography more particularly. Identifying in geographical political economy and geographies of 
marketization two strands of scholarly literature that drive this revival, we positioned ourselves 
in the latter, cultural economy perspective without negating the limits and weaknesses of such an 
approach. It has been our main aim to develop a more systematic account of marketization by 
entering into a constructive dialogue with geographical political economy. Engaging with the 
rise of economic behaviorism and experimentalism, and its manifestation in social policy design 
and implementation, we put forward a number of conceptual dimensions for a more nuanced en-
gagement with de/marketization that we think advance scholarly work in at least two ways. 
First, while agreeing with those who point to the relational entanglements between ideal-
type market models and real markets, we raised attention to the ongoing attempt by economists 
and economic practitioners to (re)naturalize this distinction. We illustrated the continuing ur-
gency of this by analyzing the emergence of a seemingly new orthodoxy when thinking about 
economy and markets: BEE. Against stylized binary accounts we introduced a conceptualization 
of markets (or indeed any other economic entity) as diverse, that is, as articulations of a variety 
of economic and social rationalities that cannot be reduced to a market logic, however under-
stood. Our example of social impact investment is a good example for how ideal understandings 
of market exchange and competition, state-driven redistribution, and reciprocal community rela-
tions are articulated in a process where each principle’s limits are made visible in dialogue with 
the respective other. This also allows us to go beyond the idea of the economy as being encapsu-
lated by the social (i.e., embeddedness) and to be more open to what exactly social patterning is 
about. This includes instances where the social becomes embedded in particular ideas about mar-
ket and economy. In sum, such a perspective is always open to processes of marketization and 
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demarketization at the same time. It does not start with pregiven distinctions between micro and 
macro, economic and social, market and society, but rather investigates the processes of dis/en-
tanglement that bring these divisions about, in so doing temporally stabilizing and ordering a 
messy world. 
Second, we turned to the how of marketization, focusing on the joint work of humans and 
nonhumans in making markets possible. We directed attention to the stabilizing force of market 
devices, being involved in boundary work both socially and geographically. And we sought to 
counter one-sided representations of social studies of economization as an approach overempha-
sizing the role of things and objects. Our argument here is that market struggles connect with the 
formation of quasi-subjects that oscillate between attempts to reestablish autonomy (re-moderni-
zation) and their dissolution in the disciplining webs of behavioral nudges, metrics, and experi-
mental evidence. It is the conceptualization of marketization as a boundary struggle that allows 
us to be sensitive toward questions of inequalities and asymmetric power relations. This includes 
the acknowledgment of marketization as an inherently unequal process shot through with prac-
tices of de/valuation and exclusion/inclusion. Another aspect of this is our observation that we 
are always only dealing with the appearance of stability. Necessary ambivalences and misfires of 
marketization provide openings for alternative imaginations, including the possibility to advance 
alternatives, to engage in conscious attempts of “demarketization” and resistance.  
It has been our intention throughout the preceding discussion to engage more directly 
with the geographies of marketization than has been the case in earlier contributions to the schol-
arly debate. Our main way to do this was by linking institutional struggles around de/marketiza-
tion with b/ordering, highlighting how “everyday practices of value creation, devaluation, and 
exclusion (...) reproduce the uneven geographies of global capitalism” (Bair et al. 2013, 2546). 
Expressing itself at various moments in marketization processes, b/ordering is deeply implicated 
in the highly variegated local translation of Market knowledge. It intervenes in the production of 
global–local arrangements that defy simple fixity/mobility and local/global dualisms. B/ordering 
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gives the work of market devices additional force by mapping market–nonmarket binaries into 
places that are represented as already belonging to and those that apparently still wait to be con-
quered by the rational whip of the Market. And it works at the level of the human subject, sepa-
rating experts from humans and being an integral part of attempts to regain autonomy. It is in all 
these ways that a marketization perspective is capable of helping us to better understand the am-
biguous formation of economic entities and to play a prominent role in the scholarly engagement 
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